Aviation Antipatterns Thread
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Looks like shoddy assembly is to blame:
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@Deadfast said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
Looks like shoddy assembly is to blame
Given that the plane was almost new, it was obvious from the start it was a manufacturing issue. The question was only what specifically.
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@Deadfast said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
Looks like shoddy assembly is to blame:
Sounds like bolt not tightened sufficiently and vibrated loose. Which raises the question, could this have happened to an actual in-use emergency exit?
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Just retire the entire 737 Max fleet, the whole line has been defective this entire time.
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@PleegWat said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
Sounds like bolt not tightened sufficiently and vibrated loose. Which raises the question, could this have happened to an actual in-use emergency exit?
Since it is the same door whether it is blinded from inside or not, I suppose it could happen to the non-blinded ones too. And it could happen to the main door, which are the same construction; it would be slightly less dangerous there since nobody is sitting next to those.
The overwing exits are different construction, so this does not imply anything about those.
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@Bulb said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
@Deadfast said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
Looks like shoddy assembly is to blame
Given that the plane was almost new, it was obvious from the start it was a manufacturing issue. The question was only what specifically.
If these additional emergency exits were really closed with wrench, maybe the switch was not fully rotated to the end?
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@boomzilla "You wanted extra seat space? We give you that!"
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@PleegWat said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
Sounds like bolt not tightened sufficiently and vibrated loose. Which raises the question, could this have happened to an actual in-use emergency exit?
The bolts are cross-drilled, and they have castellated nuts. Unless the cotter pins weren't installed at all, it's literally impossible for them to vibrate loose.
According to Blancolirio's latest video, the unused door is actually different from an operable door. At one point, he calls it a "plug-type door plug" — a plug that replaces a plug-type door. And the bolts in question are supposed to prevent it from moving in the direction it would need to move in order to open. The hinges are at the bottom of the doors/plugs. They slide downward to free the latching lugs from the latches, allowing them to swing out and down. There are bolts that prevent the door/plug from sliding on the hinge rods, and there are bolts that prevent the lugs from coming out of the latches. From the pictures Juan showed, I think there are 14 bolts that would all have to fail for the plug to open. That seems nearly impossible, but here we are.
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@Bulb said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
The Ugly Truth About Mental Health in Aviation. – 08:21
— This is Your Captain Speaking… aviation industry has learned to incentivize reporting mistakes, but when it comes to stress leading to mental health issues, it's doing it still wrong.
Mentour Pilot published his analysis with similar conclusion:
Pilot on Mushrooms.. The Nightmare on Alaska Airlines flight 2059 – 29:59
— Mentour Pilot@The_Quiet_One said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
@HardwareGeek According to what I've read he was on his way to SFO to be ON-DUTY.
According to the Mentour Pilot's narrative not yet. He mentions the pilot wasn't scheduled to fly for 6 days and was flying home two days after taking the drugs, so he still had 4 days before next duty.
PS: What's up with the OneBox‽
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@HardwareGeek said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
From the pictures Juan showed, I think there are 14 bolts that would all have to fail for the plug to open. That seems nearly impossible, but here we are.
No, he only mentions 4 bolts, two at the bottom locking the hinges and two at the top locking the tracks there. There are I think 12 pads that just hold the door against the pressure when the door is properly positioned, but those are just contact points with no bolts in them.
Also while the door are the same size as the four (two forward and two aft) door, they open downward instead of to the side, so they are clearly different construction.
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@Bulb said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
There are I think 12 pads that just hold the door against the pressure when the door is properly positioned, but those are just contact points with no bolts in them.
My bad. I watched it last night but misremembered it this morning. I thought each of those had bolts. Still, 4 bolts failing simultaneously means somebody (designer or assembler) done messed up.
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@HardwareGeek It sure does.
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More loose bolts:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k9QTjdFA6pkAnd a terrible synthesized voice reading the announcement. Don't bother listening; the title says all you really need to know.
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And I'm surprised nobody mentioned the biggest accident of late yet, the Accident: JAL A359 at Tokyo on Jan 2nd 2024, collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and burst into flames.
I'll link Jet Boss: Laura Savino's video this time
HANEDA CRASH WHY IT HAPPENED – 19:36
— Jet Boss: Laura SavinoShe has a bit more analysis than blancolirio and doesn't rant like Dan Gryder. Couple of points i took from the two sources:
- There is a lot to be criticised on part of the tower controller and general procedures:
- The Coast Guard aircraft, despite using the same runway, was on a different tower frequency, therefore missing opportunity to hear the landing clearance for the approaching JAL516.
- The controller was not using correct phraseology. The clearance should have included the words “and hold short of runway 34R”, but did not.
- The additional “number one” might have mislead the Coast Guard pilot to think he is the first to use the runway when it just meant he's first at the holding point and there is still landing in front of him. They already said they'll stop saying those (per the AVH article).
- The controller never checked whether the Coast Guard aircraft followed the instructions either visually or on the radar screen. And there was enough time, the aircraft stood there lined up for 40 seconds before the collision.
- Also I'm not sure how long the alert was flashing on the screen, but I suppose at least 30 of the 40 seconds it did, so the screen should have been quite conspicuous.
- Most credit for the good outcome goes to the sturdy construction of the A350, especially the carbon fibre composite fuselage.
- The nose hit the tail of the DHC-8, on the edge as it presents most resistance, and the forward bulkhead did not break
- The engines and main gear went through the DHC-8's wings, again on the edge, and remained attached.
- And most importantly, the fuselage resisted fire for more than the insanely long 18 minutes it took for everybody to get out!
- It took them quite long, around 5 minutes, to initiate the evacuation, but I understand the desire to make sure the egress route is safe before using it. In fact the right engine indeed did not shut down (there was enough fire around it that the R2 and R3 door wouldn't have been considered anyway, nor were the L2 and L3).
- I didn't expect some people to react to being in a fire so that they froze and it took over 10 minutes to get them to get up and leave.
- There is a lot to be criticised on part of the tower controller and general procedures:
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@Bulb said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
doesn't rant like Dan Gryder.
But he does it so well! He's kinda the @blakeyrat of aviation. He sometimes (usually, unlike Blakey) has some very good points, but he's often very annoying (to some people).
And most importantly, the fuselage resisted fire for more than the insanely long 18 minutes it took for everybody to get out!
When I first saw the pictures of the wreckage, I thought exactly the opposite. But then I learned that they basically stopped fighting the fire and just let it burn once everyone was evacuated, so looking worse than others doesn't necessarily mean it was more flammable.
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@HardwareGeek said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
@Bulb said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
doesn't rant like Dan Gryder.
But he does it so well! He's kinda the @blakeyrat of aviation. He sometimes (usually, unlike Blakey) has some very good points, but he's often very annoying (to some people).
He often has good points, but in this case, like some similar ones, he's failing to consider other circumstances. Like saying they should have started the evacuation earlier without considering the need to check the engines are stopped (they were not) and the fact that while the cabin ingested some smoke, the situation wasn't getting worse, so they, correctly, didn't feel the danger was immediate.
And most importantly, the fuselage resisted fire for more than the insanely long 18 minutes it took for everybody to get out!
When I first saw the pictures of the wreckage, I thought exactly the opposite. But then I learned that they basically stopped fighting the fire and just let it burn once everyone was evacuated, so looking worse than others doesn't necessarily mean it was more flammable.
The article mentions somewhere that the fires burned for eight hours.
There still was some jet fuel and that inevitably caught fire sooner or later. And as all firefighters know, when fuel, or something similarly flammable, is around it's best to let it burn out. Otherwise it is prone to flaring up again exactly when you think the fire is finally extinguished.
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I should have also noted that in some earlier cases of aircraft fires, the fuselage burned through in around five minutes. E.g. in Accident: China Airlines B738 at Okinawa on Aug. 20th 2007, airplane in flames arriving at stand, the fire started from a relatively small leak in the wing just as the aircraft arrived at stand and some five and half minutes later (evacuation was complete after three and a bit) the structure started failing—from the fire alone, since that time there was no collision. Aluminium fails very quickly past certain point. The carbon fibre composite did really, really well.
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More updates, including which bolts are loose:
"Yes, We Have No Bolts" 9 Jan 737 Max-9 Update – 22:22
— blancolirio
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@HardwareGeek … and more Boeing fuck-ups. Sounds like they messed up quite hard again.
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@Bulb said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
The controller was not using correct phraseology. The clearance should have included the words “and hold short of runway 34R”, but did not.
I agree with most of it, except this. "Hold short of runway..." is not required phraseology, unless Japanese RT differs from ICAO standard.
Entering a runway is only allowed when explicitly cleared to do so ("cleared to cross" or "line up").The additional “number one” might have mislead the Coast Guard pilot to think he is the first to use the runway when it just meant he's first at the holding point and there is still landing in front of him. They already said they'll stop saying those (per the AVH article).
The "number one" is indeed very misleading, and I consider this a major factor leading up to the accident.
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@nerd4sale said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
"Hold short of runway..." is not required phraseology, unless Japanese RT differs from ICAO standard.
At least one of the reports I watched explicitly stated it was not typically used there, but it is required, or at least standardized, in some countries due to similar accidents.
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Also yesterday after watching the blancolirio video, youtube offered me these suggestions:
The gist is a bunch of people saying that Boeing, and it's spinoff Spirit Aerosystem (which assembles the fuselages), still or again have systemic quality management problems and there have been a bunch of complaints filed against them (that are in various stages of progress).
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@Bulb said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
Boeing, and it's spinoff Spirit Aerosystem (which assembles the fuselages), still or again have systemic quality management problems
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@Bulb Did they learn that from Mr. Ford?
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Fixed
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Couple Suing Hot Air Balloon Pilot For Flying Over Their Property – 11:11
— Steve LehtoHot Air Balloon Update: Plaintiffs LOST – 16:12
— Steve Lehto
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Oh look another problem with the 737. Edit: though not one of the 737 Max ones...
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@Arantor Cracked windows happen at least a dozen times a year across all types of aircraft. It is generally a non-issue.
If the inner layer is not cracked (the pilots can't reliably tell which layers are cracked except for the inner one), they may complete the flight, but it has to be fixed before the next departure, so if they are heading from the company hub to some outstation, the dispatch will likely tell them to turn back to avoid having the plane stuck at the outstation for a couple of days. If the inner layer is cracked, it's treated similar to a decompression, so descent to 10,000 and continue fuel permitting.
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@Bulb said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
It is generally a non-issue.
Generally.
While the aircraft was flying over Didcot, Oxfordshire, an improperly installed windscreen panel separated from its frame, causing the captain to be partially ejected from the aircraft. He was held in place through the window frame for 20 minutes until the first officer landed at Southampton Airport.
Note that to everyone's suprise, the captain survived and went on to continue flying until his retirement.
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@Arantor said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
crack found in cockpit window
You're really not supposed to be smoking that stuff on duty.
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"FAA formally notified Boeing that it is conducting an investigation to determine if Boeing failed to ensure completed products conformed to its approved design and were in a condition for safe operation in compliance with FAA regulations.... Boeing's manufacturing practices need to comply with the high safety standards they're legally accountable to meet."
Boeing 737 -9 Plug Doors and Spirit Aerospace Lawsuit – 21:03
— blancolirio
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@Bulb said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
Aluminium fails very quickly past certain point
Above all, because it melts at only 660°C, which most fires will trivially exceed.
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@Steve_The_Cynic And most alloys melt at even lower temperatures. The very common 6061 alloy melts at 585°C. Some alloys melt at <500°C.
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@TimeBandit part's
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@TimeBandit All?
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@dkf said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
@TimeBandit All?
It says "all that gave us trouble", not "all that have some kind of MBA'd in"
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@LaoC There's always time for another incident.
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@dkf said in Aviation Antipatterns Thread:
@LaoC There's always time for another incident.
The day ends in a y, so yes.
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LOL, Spicejet.
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@boomzilla it's missing the real punchline:
"... and he got charged extra for a seat with leg room!"
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Sir we tried our best to open the door, however we could not open. Do not panic, we are landing in few mins, so please close the commode lid and sit on it and secure urself. As soon as the main door is open engineer will come. do not panic.
I didn't know airliner toilets are equipped with seatbelts.