PARADE!



  • @JimM said:

    @flabdablet said:

    I don't believe it's complicated at all.

     <long complicated probability discussion>

     

    ;)

    Amusingly, the real mistake is thinking that you need to calculate any probability after you've chosen the door. You don't. It stops being a probability problem the minute you make your choice, because at that point the outcome is fixed: at that point you've either picked a goat or a car, so the probability of switching wins is already either 0 or 1. Everything that happens after you pick a door is - as far as probabilityis concerned - irrelevant.

     And that's why the problem isn't complicated: you only need to calculate one probability.

     

    You could try to calculate the probabilities beforehand, but that assumes that you knew the entire rules of the game before picking a door.  The rules as originally stated in this thread do not state that YOU knew Monty was going to open another door, even if you assume that MONTY was always going to open another door (which, as I previously brought up, is also not stated in the rules and has the potential to massively change everything, but let's assume for this post that he was aways going to open another door.)  At the very least, the first time this game was played, presumably the person did not know that Monty was going to open another door.  That person would have had to calculate more than one probability - first, the probability that picking a particular door would win (which is rather a trivial 1/3 for all doors, of course, but it had to be calculated!) and then the Monty Hall problem after the goat was revealed at and became apparent that it WAS the Monty Hall problem (it wouldn't have had that name yet, but that doesn't matter.)

    See, on a game like this, it's often dangerous to make assumptions.  You may think you know the rules, but game shows love changing the rules.  They pretty much have to honor what they've explicity told you (for example, they can't have 3 goats and no car if they tell you there's a car) but they could easily add some other twist.

    And a common twist (seen in the actual game show) is for Monty to offer you some sum of money to take a particular action.  This offer could potentially be made at any time during the process.  At this point it would be helpful to know the current state of probabilities based on all available information at whatever point this offer is made.  Is Monty ignorant, does he non-randomly pick the goat door, is he more likely to offer money in particular circumstances, is Monty going to offer you even MORE money if you refuse his first offer, etc.

    Now, maybe it turns out that the game plays out exactly as you expect.  But it would be silly to shut your brain off and assume everything will go exactly as planned with no additional conditions.

    Of course, if you add the possibility of Monty offering you money, you can say that's not the Monty Hall problem anymore.  True - but it's something that actually happens on his game show, so it would be kinda silly to ignore that possibility.  Anyway, the point is:  you can't say "you only need to calculate the probabilities once" unless you know that you know ALL of the rules.

     



  • @flabdablet said:

    @PalmerEldritch said:

    If you like phrase the problem as follows:

    "Suppose you're on a game show, and you're given the choice of 3 doors. Behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats. You pick a door and the host, who knows what's behind all the doors, opens one of the two doors which you didn't pick and reveals a goat. He then says to you, "Do you want to stay with your 1st pick or switch to the door I didn't open?" Is it to your advantage to switch your choice?"

    You now have: 'The Door you Picked', 'The Door Monty Opened', and 'The Door Monty didn't Open' . In order to evaluate whether it's advantageous to switch doors you need to calculate the conditional probability of both 'The Door you Picked' and ''The Door Monty didn't Open''. To do this you use Bayes Theory which isn't dependent on any specific door numbering.

    I'd like to see you work that calculation step by step, if you don't mind.
     

    Here you go, it's a standard derivation.

    We have 3 doors: 'The Door You Picked' , 'The Door Monty Picked', and 'The Door Monty Didn't Pick'

    Lets rename these as doors x,y, and z.

    Also let X,Y, and Z denote the events that the car is behind doors x,y, and z respectively.

    Let O denote the event that Monty opens door y.

    We want to calculate:

    • Pr(X|O) The probability the car is behind door x, given Monty opens door y

    • Pr(Z|O) The probability the car is behind door z, given Monty opens door y


    Bayes Theory tells us that:

    • Pr(X|O) = Pr(O|X).Pr(X)/Pr(O) and

    • Pr(Z|O) = Pr(O|Z).Pr(Z)/Pr(O)


    and since events X,Y, and Z are mutually exclusive the Law of Total Probability tells us that:

    • Pr(O) = Pr(O|X).Pr(X) + Pr(O|Y).Pr(Y) + Pr(O|Z).Pr(Z)


    Calculating the conditional probabilities for event O, we have

    • Pr(O|Z) = 1 (if the car is behind door z, Monty is forced to open door y)

    • Pr(O|Y) = 0 (if the car is behind door y, Monty can't open it)

    • Pr(O|X) = ? (if the car is behind door x, Monty has a choice of doors to open. Let's say this probability value = q. If it's superfluous to requirements it'll drop out of the equation anyway)


    Since we know the prior probabilities for events X,Y, and Z are:

    • Pr(X) = Pr(Y) = Pr(Z) = 1/3, it follows that

    • Pr(O) = (q*1/3) + (0*1/3) + (1*1/3) = q/3 + 1/3 = (q+1)/3


    Substituting these values into our Bayes equations we get:

    • Pr(X|O) = q*1/3/[(q+1)/3] = q/(q+1), and

    • Pr (Z|O) = 1/3/[(q+1)/3] = 1/(q+1)


    So the conditional probabilities that the car is behind door x or door z depend on the value of q, the value assigned to the probability Monty opens door y when he has a choice of 2 doors to open.

    If q = ½, that is Monty opens a door at random then

    • Pr(X|O) = 1/3 and Pr(Z|O) = 2/3. These probabilities mirror the proportion of times we'd expect to win over multiple trials by a) always staying, and b) always switching.


    If q = 1, that is Monty always opens door y then

    • Pr(X|O) = Pr(Z|O) = ½. In other words there is no advantage to be gained by switching doors.

     

     

     



  • @PalmerEldritch said:

    @flabdablet said:

    @PalmerEldritch said:

    If you like
    phrase the problem as follows:

    "Suppose you're on a game show,
    and you're given the choice of 3 doors.
    Behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats. You pick a door and
    the host, who knows what's behind all the doors, opens one of the two
    doors which you didn't pick and reveals a goat. He then says to you, "Do
    you
    want to stay with your 1st pick or switch to the door I didn't open?" Is
    it to your advantage to switch your choice?"

    You now have:
    'The Door you Picked', 'The Door Monty Opened', and 'The Door Monty
    didn't Open' . In order to evaluate whether it's advantageous to switch
    doors you need to calculate the conditional probability of both 'The
    Door you Picked' and ''The Door Monty didn't Open''. To do this you use
    Bayes Theory which isn't dependent on any specific door numbering.

    I'd like to see you work that calculation step by step, if you don't mind.
     

    Here you go, it's a standard derivation.

    OK. Before I start with this, please let me just say you should disregard my own calculation above. It's a tissue of lies from start to finish, due to a completely egregious error in the statement of the conditional probability formula.

    Even so, the conclusion is correct, and your conclusion isn't. And here's why.

    @PalmerEldritch said:

    We have 3 doors: 'The Door You Picked' , 'The Door
    Monty Picked', and 'The Door Monty Didn't Pick'

    Lets rename these as doors x,y, and z.

    Also let X,Y, and Z denote the events that the car is behind doors x,y, and z respectively.

    Let Odenote the event that Monty opens door y.

    We want to calculate:

    • Pr(X|O) The probability the car is behind door x, given Monty opens door y

    • Pr(Z|O) The probability the car is behind door z, given Monty opens door y


    Bayes Theory tells us that:

    • Pr(X|O) = Pr(O|X).Pr(X)/Pr(O) and

    • Pr(Z|O) = Pr(O|Z).Pr(Z)/Pr(O)


    and since events X,Y, and Z are mutually exclusive the Law of Total Probability tells us that:

    • Pr(O) = Pr(O|X).Pr(X) + Pr(O|Y).Pr(Y) + Pr(O|Z).Pr(Z)


    Calculating the conditional probabilities for event O, we have

    • Pr(O|Z) = 1 (if the car is behind door z, Monty is forced to open door y)

    • Pr(O|Y) = 0 (if the car is behind door y, Monty can't open it)

    • Pr(O|X) = ? (if the car is behind door x, Monty has a choice of doors to open. Let's say this probability value = q. If it's superfluous to requirements it'll drop out of the equation anyway)

    So far so good, mostly.

    @PalmerEldritch said:

    Since we know the prior probabilities
    for events X,Y, and Z are:

    • Pr(X) = Pr(Y) = Pr(Z) = 1/3

    BZZZZZZT! No, we don't know that at all, and this is exactly what I meant when I suggested upthread that you'd conflated a model where the doors were labelled by function (which is what you started with here) and one where they're labelled consistently (as used by all the analyses you've been disputing). Y denotes the event that the car is behind door y, but door y is by your working definition the door Monty opened, and Monty must always open a goat door. Pr(Y) = 0 (which incidentally means Pr(O|Y) is undefined, not zero; hence "mostly").

    Pr(X) is still 1/3, because you had only a 1 in 3 chance of guessing the car's location in the first place and Monty's choice of doors doesn't affect the labelling of door x. And since events X, Y and Z are mutually exclusive and cover all possible outcomes, the Law of Total Probability gives us Pr(Z) = 2/3.

    Also: O denotes the event that Monty opens door y, but since you've defined door y as the one Monty opened, Pr(O) = 1. From which we can calculate Pr(X|O) = Pr(X) = 1/3 and Pr(Z|O) = Pr(Z) = 2/3 directly, without needing to bother with Bayes.



  • @flabdablet said:

    @PalmerEldritch said:

    Since we know the prior probabilities for events X,Y, and Z are:
    • Pr(X) = Pr(Y) = Pr(Z) = 1/3

    BZZZZZZT! No, we don't know that at all, and this is exactly what I meant when I suggested upthread that you'd conflated a model where the doors were labelled by function (which is what you started with here) and one where they're labelled consistently (as used by all the analyses you've been disputing). Y denotes the event that the car is behind door y, but door y is by your working definition the door Monty opened, and Monty must always open a goat door. Pr(Y) = 0 (which incidentally means Pr(O|Y) is undefined, not zero; hence "mostly").

    Pr(X) is still 1/3, because you had only a 1 in 3 chance of guessing the car's location in the first place and Monty's choice of doors doesn't affect the labelling of door x. And since events X, Y and Z are mutually exclusive and cover all possible outcomes, the Law of Total Probability gives us Pr(Z) = 2/3.

    Also: O denotes the event that Monty opens door y, but since you've defined door y as the one Monty opened, Pr(O) = 1. From which we can calculate Pr(X|O) = Pr(X) = 1/3 and Pr(Z|O) = Pr(Z) = 2/3 directly, without needing to bother with Bayes.


    Good grief. Initially the car is randomly placed behind 1 of the 3 doors. That means the prior probabilty (that is before you pick a door and before Monty opens a door)  the car is behind door 1 = prior prob it's behind door 2 =prior  prob it's behind Door 3 = 1/3. If we can't even agree on that it's totally pointless discussing any mathematical approach to the problem, and no wonder your attempted Bayesian analysis didn't make sense, you don't seem to understand the concepts or terms involved.

    Anyway, since you've already agreed in an earlier post that when Monty implements a strategy of always opening a particular door if he can, then the probability of switching doors when he does open his favoured door = 50%,  it seems futile attempting to convince you of the same using maths.

     



  • @PalmerEldritch said:

    Good grief. Initially the car is randomly placed behind 1 of the 3 doors. That means the prior probabilty (that is before you pick a door and before Monty opens a door)  the car is behind door 1 = prior prob it's behind door 2 =prior  prob it's behind Door 3 = 1/3.

    Sure. But we have not yet generated the labellings you specified at the start of your analysis. So we start with three unlabelled doors,each of which also has a 1/3 chance of being the one with the car. And I pick one, which according to your specified labelling we now call door x. And, as you correctly note, Pr(X) is 1/3. But you have no justification at all for calling Pr(Y) and Pr(Z) "prior probabilities" because those names will not belong to doors until after Monty's choice.

    If you want to work with prior probabilities that mean something, you're going to need to label your doors before you even start. So before the initial pick, let's give the doors arbitrary but fixed labels a, b and c, and let's stick with your convention for using an uppercase letter to represent the event that the car is behind the door with the corresponding lowercase letter. That way, you won't end up reasoning about Pr(Y) when what you actually mean is something more like Pr(C | (y is c)).

    After Monty opens his door you can apply the labelling you specified at the start of your analysis. Whichever door he opens becomes door y, which makes Pr(O) = 1 by definition, meaning that Pr(X|O) and Pr(Z|O) instantly degenerate to Pr(X) and Pr(Z).

    We now have Pr(X) = 1/3 and Pr(Y) = 0, leading to Pr(Z) = 1 - 1/3 - 0 = 2/3. Job done.

    Oh, and we also know that q = Pr(O|X) = 1, from first principles: an event that's certain to occur is automatically independent of any other. You can run Pr(X|O) through Bayes to verify that result if it makes you feel better. You can also ignore my succint analysis here and come up with some Byzantine construction involving Pr(A) and Pr(B) and Pr(C) and Pr(x is a) and Pr(x is b) and Pr(x is c) if that makes you feel better too. But if it comes out with any result other than "switching is to the player's advantage in the scenario as presented", there is an error in it.

    @PalmerEldritch said:

    no wonder your attempted Bayesian analysis didn't make sense, you don't seem to understand the concepts or terms involved.
    Making errors is different from not understanding things. I understand this stuff just fine. Apparently unlike your good self, I also know better than to spend time deciding whether the best tool for driving nails is a bottle or a shoe when I have a hammer.

    @PalmerEldritch said:

    Anyway, since you've already agreed in an earlier post that when Monty implements a strategy of always opening a particular door if he can, then the probability of switching doors when he does open his favoured door = 50%,  it seems futile attempting to convince you of the same using maths.

    And since you continue to overlook the fact that your wonky labelling makes you forget about the other consequence of such a strategy, which is that in the 1/3 of cases when he can't open his favoured door the contestant's chance of winning by switching rises to 100%; and since you think the fact that 2/3 * 50% + 1/3 * 100% = 6623% is unimportant, what with 2/3 being an "overwhelming majority" and all, it seems futile attempting to convince you that maths only gives correct results when correctly applied.



  • Let me just put in a pre-emptive strike here before you try to misapply the Principle of Indifference to support a claim that choice of labels could not possibly matter.

    Essentially what we're looking at here is the distinction between the probability of event C, an asteroid destroying all life on any arbitrarily labelled planet c, and the probability of event Y, an asteroid destroying all life on planet y, where the meaning of "planet y" is "a planet upon which an asteroid has destroyed all life".

    C has a (very low) prior probability (where "prior" means "before an asteroid destroys all life on some planet"), but Y does not. There's an implicit "given" in the second labelling that's simply not present in the first: Pr(Y) needs to be read as Pr(C | (y is c)), which is the probability of C given itself, which is 1.



  • It's simple (Flame me now!): The probability of picking the door with the car at the beginning of the problem is 1/3. But then after the host opens a door with the goat, you have a new choice, thus a new probability, which is 1/2. There can be as many doors as you like, and the choice of picking the right one is always one in however many doors are left. The number of doors you start with is irrelevant to the problem once they have been opened to show a goat. Yes, your chances of picking the right door go up, but only to 50%, no matter how many doors you have nor how many rounds of opening doors occur. Once it comes down to two doors, the probability of picking the door with the car is always going to be 50/50.

    In the event of one million doors, picking one door out of 1 million is extremely low, so we might as well pick randomly. But once the host opens all the doors but yours and one other, whether all at once or one at a time (optionally offering the choice to change), you still only have a one in two chance of picking the door with the car. If I picked door #133,846, and the only other door not opened was #745,821, I would still only have a 50% chance of getting the car if I switched, and I would only have a 50% chance of getting the car if I kept my choice. The probability of my picking the right door in the beginning is 1/1.000.000, and the probability of my picking the right door at the end is 1/2, so I would probably switch, but I cannot get any better odds than 50/50.

    The odds with three doors only rises to 50%, but 33.33% at the beginning compared to 50% at the end means the odds of picking the right door have gone up, but only to 50%. It won't go any higher.

    And since it was mentioned at some point on the first page (no, I have not read every post in this discussion), an airplane on a treadmill will always take off. The plane does not push against the ground, so no matter how fast the treadmill runs, the plane will still move forward and be able to take off. Of course, this assumes the wheels are ideally free-spinning (which I believe is part of the problem description). The only way to keep the plane grounded by running the treadmill is to have the treadmill affect the airflow around the plane to keep the air moving forward at the same speed as the plane, but the treadmill is moving in the wrong direction to have air scoops or fans attached to it. But then we're getting outside the bounds of the stated problem.



  • @Jedalyzer said:

    Flame me now!

    Okay. Let's say we each pick a door out of the 1000000 doors without telling each other. Then if your door is the same as my door, you win, and if they're different, I win. It's a fair game because it's a 50:50 chance, right?



  • @Jedalyzer said:

    once the host opens all the doors but yours and one other, whether all at once or one at a time (optionally offering the choice to change), you still only have a one in two chance of picking the door with the car.

    This would be true if the host were also opening doors at random without paying attention to where the car is. But since the host is not doing that - he's opening doors that he knows the car is not behind - then every door he opens is a clue to which one the car is behind, unless it's behind the one you picked first.

    The million-doors variation is useful because it makes it intuitively clear just how much more likely you are to be playing one of the 999,999 possible games where the host is generously leading you toward the door with the car, in which you win if you switch. Only if you're playing that one game in a million where you'd picked the door with the car initially do you lose by switching.

    You're essentially confusing yourself the same way PalmerEldritch has been, by focusing way too much analysis on some particular game instance, to the detriment of your understanding of the bigger picture. The simple fact is that if every door the host opens is 100% guaranteed not to reveal the car, then the only choice whose probability affects that of the outcome is your initial one-in-N choice. If you got that right (probability 1/N) then switching loses. If you got it wrong (probability (N-1)/N) then switching wins. All other considerations are total red herrings.


  • Considered Harmful

    You could just run the simulation I provided source and output for, which showed after 100,000 trials nigh exactly 66.67% win after switch and after 100,000 more nigh exactly 33.33% win after no-switch.



  • @flabdablet said:

    the only choice whose probability affects that of the outcome is your initial one-in-N choice.

    That's actually a very slight oversimplification, which may be the point that PalmerEldritch has been so keen to make sure we all understand.

    If you have information about Monty's process for choosing doors, then depending which specific doors he actually opens you might be able to reason your way to a probability that you're in one of the rarer staying-wins games of more than 1/N. But you can never get it higher than 1/2 even given complete knowledge of Monty's choice procedure, which means that staying is never actually advantageous compared to switching.

    Balancing that are games where the same kind of reasoning can raise the probability that you will indeed win by switching from (N-1)/N to something higher than that; could be all the way to complete certainty, if you have complete knowledge of Monty's processes (this is the point that I've been keen to make sure PalmerEldritch doesn't sweep under his rug). But once again, all this can do is make your optimal strategy (always switch when you can) a little more optimal should you find yourself in such a game.

    The chance that these special cases will actually arise balances their anomalous expected returns in such a way as to maintain the probability that an always-switch strategy will win at exactly (N-1)/N. No other strategy is better, most are worse, and all are harder to calculate. So switching doors is always to your advantage.



  • @flabdablet said:

    @flabdablet said:
    the only choice whose probability affects that of the outcome is your initial one-in-N choice.

    That's actually a very slight oversimplification, which may be the point that PalmerEldritch has been so keen to make sure we all understand.

    If you have information about Monty's process for choosing doors, then depending which specific doors he actually opens you might be able to reason your way to a probability that you're in one of the rarer staying-wins games of more than 1/N. But you can never get it higher than 1/2

    .

    Which is in contradiction to previous comments you've made.

    @flabdablet said:

    Therefore, whether Monty will pick one of them vs. the other is completely irrelevant to the contestant's chance of winning by switching

    @flabdablet said:

    .....then the probability of winning by switching becomes 2/3 without needing your third condition; that is, your third condition is superfluous

     @flabdablet said:

    switching doors becomes logically equivalent to picking the best prize available from two doors you didn't pick originally, doubling your chance of winning. Probabilities associated with Monty's choice of goat door simply don't enter the calculation.

    @flabdablet said:

    Can you think of a scenario ….... that can reduce your chance of winning by switching below 2/3? I haven't yet managed t

    I can't be bothered to go through your flawed analysis of the Bayes solution I posted. As I said it's a standard derivation, and if you were to look at any of the 35,500 web pages devoted to a Bayes Solution of the MHP you'd find similar proofs by the thousand, many of them written by people with far more mathematical knowledge than me (if you're interested I can recommend Stephen Lucas and Jason Rosenhouse who've co-written several articles on the MHP - Jason Rosenhouse has written an enitire book on the subject. Both are Professors of Mathematics at James Madison University)

     @flabdablet said:

    Balancing that are games where the same kind of reasoning can raise the probability that you will indeed win by switching from (N-1)/N to something higher than that; could be all the way to complete certainty,

    This statement by itself should demonstrate why your "succint analysis" is incorrect. Your solution gives a value for Pr(Z|O) = 2/3 in all cases as there are no variables that can change which will yield a different result. But we can formulate instances of the game where Pr(Z|O) can have any value between 1/2 and 1. If the maths doesn't agree with the observed results then the maths is wrong. The Bayes solution I posted can handle all possible values of Pr(Z|O) by changing the value of the variable 'q' 

    Of course if you want to you can posit an alternative theory of probability, one where prior and posterior probabilities are interchangeable, and an event may not only have (or not have as the case may be) an implied "given" but can be conditional upon itself (something akin as far as I can tell. to asking "what is the probability a fair coin lands heads given that it has landed heads?" ).

     



  • @PalmerEldritch said:

    I can't be bothered

    Colour me unsurprised. You're getting the hang of this "rude and arrogant" business quite nicely. Well done you.

    @PalmerEldritch said:

    (something akin as far as I can tell. to asking "what is the probability a fair coin lands heads given that it has landed heads?" )

    This is exactly analogous to asking "what is Pr(O), where O is the event of Monty opening door y and door y is specified as 'the door Monty opened'".

    @PalmerEldritch said:

    Your solution gives a value for Pr(Z|O) = 2/3 in all cases as there are no variables that can change which will yield a different result. But we can formulate instances of the game where Pr(Z|O) can have any value between 1/2 and 1.

    No we can't, because Pr(O) = 1 (given the labelling you specified) which means exactly that there are no variables that can change Pr(Z|O) to any value other than Pr(Z).

    We can certainly formulate instances of the game where Pr(Z|(Monty opens some door that knowledge of his choice procedure makes to some extent predictable)) is other than 2/3, but the event of actually getting the opportunity to recognize that we are in any such game has itself some probability associated with it; and there is always going to be a complementary set of game instances that skews Pr(Z|(Monty fails to open a door as predicted by the same knowledge)) the other way, such that Pr(Z) = 2/3 when evaluated over all possible games given consistent conditions, meaning that the expected win rate from an always-switch strategy is 2/3 regardless.

    Also, as I said and you've just agreed, Pr(X|anything short of prior knowledge of the position of the car) can be at most 1/2, which means that choosing to stay can never give the player an advantage over choosing to switch regardless of what Monty's methods imply. In other words, we cannot construct a game instance where staying has a better expected win rate than switching. Which means it simply can never be worth working out what Monty's up to, which makes Condition 3 superfluous.



  • @PalmerEldritch said:

    As I said it's a standard derivation, and if you were to look at any of the 35,500 web pages devoted to a Bayes Solution of the MHP you'd find similar proofs by the thousand, many of them written by people with far more mathematical knowledge than me

    OK, so I've just done this exercise and I refer you to the solution presented here, whose conclusion is "So Bayes says we should switch, as our probability of winning the car jumps from 1/3 to 2/3."

    Also, having finally got around to reading the Wikipedia article that's the very first hit for a Google search of "Monty+Hall"+Bayes, I see that the variants section says pretty much exactly what I've been saying:

    A common variant of the problem, assumed by several academic authors as the canonical problem, does not make the simplifying assumption that the host must uniformly choose the door to open, but instead that he uses some other strategy. The confusion as to which formalization is authoritative has led to considerable acrimony, particularly because this variant makes proofs more involved without altering the optimality of the always-switch strategy for the player. In this variant, the player can have different probabilities of winning depending on the observed choice of the host, but in any case the probability of winning by switching is at least 1/2 (and can be as high as 1), while the overall probability of winning by switching is still exactly 2/3.
    (emphasis mine).

    So you'll pardon me if I can't be bothered trawling through 35,498 web pages that are only going to tell me what I already know: that you can't see the forest because you insist on standing with your face buried in an (assumed typical) tree.



  • @flabdablet said:

    @PalmerEldritch said:
    (something akin as far as I can tell. to asking "what is the probability a fair coin lands heads given that it has landed heads?" )

    This is exactly analogous to asking "what is Pr(O), where O is the event of Monty opening door y and door y is specified as 'the door Monty opened'".

    LOL. I was joking.

     

    @flabdablet said:

    No we can't, because Pr(O) = 1  which means exactly that there are no variables that can change Pr(Z|O) to any value other than Pr(Z).

    Only in your bizarre world of make-believe probability. In the real probability world (that everyone else inhabits) Pr(O) can asume any value between 1/3 and 2/3 - unless you're prepared to disagree with every mathematician who's ever derived a Bayes solution to the MHP.

    @flabdablet said:

    We can certainly formulate instances of the game where Pr(Z|(Monty opens some door that knowledge of his choice procedure makes to some extent predictable)) is other than 2/3

    We certainly can. (your "given" event is ridiculous, whether Monty's procedure is predictable or not it remains a possibility and therefore has to be accounted for, unless you assume a specific course of action beforehand - such as Monty picks a goat door at random when he has a choice)

    @flabdablet said:

    Also, as I said and you've just agreed, Pr(X|anything short of prior knowledge of the position of the car) can be at most 1/2,

    I do agree, (and "anything short of prior knowledge of the position of the car" isn't an event)

    @flabdablet said:

    OK, so I've just done this exercise and I refer you to the solution presented here, whose conclusion is "So Bayes says we should switch, as our probability of winning the car jumps from 1/3 to 2/3."

    You omitted the bit where it says this conclusion is based on Monty selecting a goat door at random when he has the choice. The website you refer me to also gives a value for Pr(O) = 1/2 (not Pr(O) = 1 as you've asserted), so if nothing else it proves your mathematical analysis is incorrect. BTW I agree with the Wiki entry, here's another quote:

    "This shows that any proposed solution to the MHP failing to pay close attention to Monty's selection procedure is incomplete". 'The Monty Hall Problem Reconsidered', Lucas and Rosenhouse.

    I think we both agree that:

    1) We can formulate instances of the MHP where switching wins with a probability of any value between 1/2 and 1

    2) The instance of a game where switching wins wth a probability of 2/3 only occurs if Monty picks a goat door at random (when he has a choice)

    3) Switching is never disadvantageous to the player (irrespective of of Monty's selection procedure)

    4) Over repeated trials of the game the proportion of games won by always switching is 2/3rds  (irrespective of of Monty's selection procedure)

    It took a while to convince you of situations 1) and 2), but you got there in the end :)

    There doesn't appear to be much left to discuss,

     

     

     

     


     



  • @PalmerEldritch said:

    In the real probability world (that everyone else inhabits) Pr(O) can asume any value between 1/3 and 2/3 - unless you're prepared to disagree with every mathematician who's ever derived a Bayes solution to the MHP.

    When real mathematicians derive Bayes solutions to the MHP, they don't explicitly specify their door labels in ways that make them depend on Monty's choice of door. You did. That means your solution degenerates in exactly the way I pointed out.

    @PalmerEldritch said:

    You omitted the bit where it says this conclusion is based on Monty selecting a goat door at random when he has the choice. The website you refer me to also gives a value for Pr(O) = 1/2 (not Pr(O) = 1 as you've asserted), so if nothing else it proves your mathematical analysis is incorrect.
    No, it proves that you still can't see the distinction between your own event O (which you defined as the event that Monty opens Door y, which you defined as the door Monty opens, which makes it totally analogous to the event that a fair coin lands on the side that it lands on) and the probability that Monty opens one of two doors that he has the choice of. I am not disputing your ability to parrot other people's equations; I am disputing your ability to specify your terms in ways that make your equations refer to the things you apparently think they do.

    @PalmerEldritch said:

    whether Monty's procedure is predictable or not it remains a possibility and therefore has to be accounted for, unless you assume a specific course of action beforehand - such as Monty picks a goat door at random when he has a choice

    A contestant who chooses to ignore Monty's choice procedure, on the grounds that he has no information about it, is quite justified in treating Monty's choosable doors as equivalent to each other for the purpose of Bayesian analysis, and therefore assigning probability 1/2 to each choice (see the Principle of Indifference).

    @PalmerEldritch said:

    I think we both agree that:

    1) We can formulate instances of the MHP where switching wins with a probability of any value between 1/2 and 1

    2) The instance of a game where switching wins wth a probability of 2/3 only occurs if Monty picks a goat door at random (when he has a choice)

    3) Switching is never disadvantageous to the player (irrespective of of Monty's selection procedure)

    4) Over repeated trials of the game the proportion of games won by always switching is 2/3rds  (irrespective of of Monty's selection procedure)

    It took a while to convince you of situations 1) and 2), but you got there in the end :)

    I don't believe I have ever disputed the fact that particular instances of the MHP game can have anomalous switching probabilities. What I have disputed and do dispute, given that switching is indeed never disadvantageous to the player, is the relevance of that to the solution of the MHP as presented. That solution is not "no, switching is not to the player's advantage" or "switching might sometimes be to the player's advantage" or "it depends on what Monty does"; the solution is "yes, switching is to the player's advantage because it will win two thirds of all possible games". The way you originally presented your Bayesian reasoning, the claim you appeared to be making was that if q=1 (i.e. Monty's door choice is always fully predictable) then the contestant's chance of winning by switching must in general be 50%, which is demonstrably untrue.

    I remain quite unconvinced about claim 2. Given that always switching demonstrably does win in 2/3 of all the equally likely combinations of car position and initial player choice, a frequentist interpretation of probability really does say that Monty's door-choice procedure is irrelevant provided only that he must reveal a goat; while under a Bayesian interpretation the contestant is quite entitled to invoke the Principle of Indifference to reach the same result. I am also quite convinced that Pr(car-is-behind-door-2 given contestant-chose-door-1 and monty-opened-door-3) is the wrong question to ask in order to decide whether or not switching doors is to the contestant's advantage. The right question is: what is Pr(switching-doors-wins)? They're clearly not the same question, or you wouldn't be able to keep coming up with different answers to each.

    @PalmerEldritch said:

    There doesn't appear to be much left to discuss

    Given that stipulations (3) and (4) appear to be all that's needed to contradict your earlier claims about the non-superfluity of Condition 3, that's probably true.



  • Bump.



  • @spamcourt said:

    Bump.


    Really now? I can't believe this thread is still going.



  • @mikeTheLiar said:

    @spamcourt said:

    Bump.

    Really now? I can't believe this thread is still going.

     



  • @El_Heffe said:

    @mikeTheLiar said:

    @spamcourt said:

    Bump.


    Really now? I can't believe this thread is still going.

     


    Is that man's penis an entire dead horse?



  • @El_Heffe said:

    Funny looking goat



  • No, that's the car.



  • @Ben L. said:

    @El_Heffe said:

    @mikeTheLiar said:

    @spamcourt said:

    Bump.

    Really now? I can't believe this thread is still going.

     

    Is that man's penis an entire dead horse?
     

    No, he took the penis off the dead horse and is now violently swaffeling the horse with its own dick.

     


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